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A recent Pennsylvania case, Penman v. Jones,' involving im-
portant coal mining interests, suggests not only some brief obser-
vations on what appears to be a novel decision as to easements,
but also some critical comments on that which is of far greater
significance: the reasoning by which the result was reached.2
The unusual chaos of conceptions and inadequacy of reasoning
in easement and license cases have not infrequently been em-
phasized-without, however, any suggestion either as to the cause
of the difficulties involved or as to the remedy to be applied.
Thus, a learned New Jersey judge, Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet,
has put the matter in terms none too strong :3
"The adjudications upon this subject [easements and
licenses] are numerous and discordant. Taken in their
aggregate, they cannot be reconciled, and if an attempt
should be made to arrange them into harmonious groups,
I think some of them would be found to be so eccentric
in their application of legal principles, as well as in their
logical deductions, as to be impossible of classification."
The difficulties so justly lamented by the New Jersey court
find striking exemplification when one ponders and compares
the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in Penman v.
Jones.5 It is believed, moreover, that a close examination of this
case and others may suggest both cause and remedy.
In 1873, A (Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co.), the owner of a
certain large tract of land, sold and conveyed a part of it to B,
excepting and reserving to the grantor, its "successors and
1 (19x7, Pa.) ioo Aft. io43.
'Similarly interesting for its reasoning and for its application of funda-
mental legal conceptions is the comparatively recent case of Graff Furnace
Co. v. Scranton Coal Co. (914) 244 Pa. 592, 598.
"East Jersey Iron Co. v. Wright (188o) 32 N. J. Eq. 248, 254. The italics
in the passage quoted from this case and also in the passages to be
hereafter quoted from other cases are those of the present writer.
"Compare Chancellor Kent's remarks on the same subject, 3 Kent, Cons.
*453.
1 (x917, Pa.) Ioo AtL 1043.
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assigns," the underlying mineral estate, in apt words creating
a fee therein, together "with the sole right and privilege to
mine and remove the same [coal and minerals] by any sub-
terranean process incident to the business of mining, without
thereby incurring, in any event whatever, any liability for injury
caused or damage done to the surface of said lot:'
Eighteen years after this, that is in 1891, A, by a single
instrument sold and conveyed to C (Lackawanna Iron & Steel
Co.) all the coal under its lands; that is, created subjaceni
estates in fee, the superjacent estates being, by exception, vested
in the grantor.6 Included in the deed of conveyance, conveying
all told about sixty-two parcels, was the subjacent mineral estate
below B's lot. While this deed conferred, comprehensively, the
"right" to "mine and remove the said coal" from the sixty-two
parcels, the right and privilege of letting down the surface were
given in specific terms only as regards a single tract not directly
connected with B's lot.
On the other hand, as regards all the parcels included, the
instrument purported to convey "all the estate, right, title,
interest, benefit, property, claim, and demand whatsoever"
together with "all and singular the . . . appurtenances . . .
belonging to the said . . . property or in any wise appertaining
to the same."
Twenty-four years later A executed a deed to D, a trust com-
pany, for "all and every the real estate or interest of any kind
or nature" in certain land including, inter alia, the lot previously
sold to B and "the coal and minerals underlying the same." Sub-
sequently D quitclaimed to E (who had derived title from B),
'The superjacent estate, though often spoken of as "remainifig," after
severance, in the grantor, is really, of course, a somewhat modified legal
interest, that is an aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities
relating to the smaller corpus of land and having somewhat different ele-
ments or characteristics than the aggregate relating to the larger corpus
originally "owned."
For this reason the usual language of the books is hardly adeuate,-
e. g., Tiffany, Real Property (i9o3) sec. 383:
"The purpose and effect of an exception in a conveyance is to except or
exclude from the operation of the conveyance some part of the thing or
things covered by the general words of description therein, as when one
conveys a piece of land, excepting a certain part thereof, or the houses
thereon, it being always of a thing actually existent. A reservation, on the
contrary, as defined by the common-law writers, is a clause by which the
grantor reserves to himself some new thing 'issuing out of' the thing
granted, and not in esse before."
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with the express purpose of investing E of the right of surface
support against the owner of the subjacent estate.
In a suit by E against F for breach of a contract to purchase
the surface lot, it was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, Moschzisker and Stewart, JJ., dissenting, that the "right
and privilege" of letting down the surface of B's lot did not
pass from A to C by the conveyance of 1891; that such "right
and privilege" did pass by the later conveyance to D; and that
by the latter's quitclaim deed the "right and privilege" were
released and extinguished in favor of E, so as to make E's
interest perfect as regards the right of surface support.
There are thus presented three questions: (I) Under the
conveyance of i89i, did the "right and privilege" of letting
down the surface of B's lot pass to C as an easement appurtenant
to the subjacent mineral estate? (2) Did such "right and
privilege" pass, under the language of the conveyance, inde-
pendently of its being an easement? (3) Was the court con-
sistent in holding, in spite of its negative answer to the second
question, that the language in the conveyance from A to D
was sufficient to pass the "right and privilege" to D? Each
of these points may, for the sake of clearness, be somewhat
separately considered.
(I) DID THE "RIGHT AND pRIVILEGE" PASS AS AN EASEMENT?
All legal interests concerning land or other tangible objects'
may, on adequate analysis, be seen to consist of more or less
comprehensive aggregates of rights (or claims), privileges,
'As regards the unfortunate tendency to blend and confuse non-legal
(physical) and legal conceptions, especially in the use of the term "prop-
erty" with rapid shifts to indicate both the physical object and the legal
interest relating to it, see the detailed discussion in the writer's article,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
23 YAix LAW JoURNAL, 16, 20 seq.
Compare also (,9,7) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 710, 721:
"A man may indeed sustain close and beneficial physical relations
to a given physical thing: he may physically control and use such
thing, and he may physically exclude others from any similar control
or enjoyment But, obviously, such purely physical relations could
as well exist quite apart from, or occasionally in spite of, the law
of organized society: physical relations are wholly distinct fromjural relations. The latter take significance from the law; and, since
the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct of human beings,
all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their mean-
ing, be predicated of such human beings. The words of able judges
may be quoted as showing their realization of the practical importance of
the point now being emphasized: Mr. Chief Justice Holmes, in Tyler v.
Court of Registration (1goo) 175 Mass. 71, 76: 'All proceedings, like all
rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights
in rem depends on the number of persons affected."
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powers, and immunities vested in the "owner" of the interest,
other persons indiscriminately being under the respective cor-
relative duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities." The
'See Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(x917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 710, 746:
"Suppose, for example, that A is fee-simple owner of Blackacre. His
'legal interest' or 'property' relating to the tangible object that we call
land consists of a complex aggregate of rights (or claims), privileges,
powers, and immunities. First: A has multital legal rights, or claims, that
others, respectively, shall not enter on the land, that they shall not cause
physical harm to the land, etc., such others being under respective correla-
tive legal duties. Second: A has an indefinite number of legal privileges
of entering on the land, using the land, harming the land, etc., that is,
within limits fixed by law on grounds of social and economic policy, he
has privileges of doing on or to the land what he pleases; and correlative
to all such legal privileges are the respective legal no-rights of other
persons. Third: A has the legal power to alienate his legal interest to
another, i. e., to extinguish his complex aggregate of jural relations and
create a new and similar aggregate in the other person; also the legal
power to create a life estate in another and concurrently to create a
reversion in himself; also the legal power to create a privilege of entrance
in any other person by giving 'leave and license'; and so on indefinitely.
Correlative to all such legal powers are the legal liabilities in other per-
sons,--this meaning that the latter are subject, nolens volens, to the changes
of jural relations involved in the exercise of A's powers. Fourth: A has
an indefinite number of legal immunities, using the term immunity in the
very specific sense of non-liability or non-subjection to a power on the part
of another person. Thus he has the immunity that no ordinary person
can alienate A's legal interest or aggregate of jural relations to another
person; the immunity that no ordinary person can extinguish A's own
privileges of using the land; the immunity that no ordinary person can
extinguish A's right that another person X shall not enter on the land or,
in other words, create in X a privilege of entering on the land. Correlative
to all these immunities are the respective legal disabilities of other persons
in general.
"In short, A has vested in himself, as regards Blackacre, multital, or
in rein, 'right-duty' relations, multital, or in rem, 'privilege-no-right'
relations, multital, or in rem, 'power-liability' relations, and multital,
or in rem, 'immunity-disability' relations. It is important in order
to have an adequate analytical view of property, to see all these
various elements in the aggregate. It is equally important, for many
reasons, that the different classes of jural relations should not be loosely
confused with one another. A's privileges, e. g., are strikingly independent
of his rights or claims against any given person, and either might exist
without the other. Thus A might, for $ioo paid to him by B, agree in
writing to keep off Blackacre. A would still have his rights or claims
against B, that the latter should keep off, etc.; yet, as against B, A's own
privileges of entering on Blackacre would be gone. On the other hand,
with regard to X's land, Whiteacre, A has, as against B, the privilege of
entering thereon; but, not having possession, he has no right, or claim,
that B shall not enter on Whiteacre."
For a more detailed analysis, explanation, and discrimination of the
fundamental jural relations, see the earlier article, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YAIE LAW
JouRNAL, 16.
As there indicated, p. 41, the best synonym for "legal privilege," in the
very specific sense of "no-duty," is "legal liberty!"
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aggregate of the easement owner differs from that of the
ordinary complete owner of land only in being far more limited
as regards the number and the quality of the constituent jural
relations involved. For this reason it is a serious obstacle to
closte analysis and clear thinking that courts and writers habitually
deal with the easement (as they do also with all other legal
interests) as if it were a simple unity to be adequately described
by a few loose and ambiguous terms such as "property," "title,"
"ownership," "right of ownership," "right," "privilege," "incor-
poreal (!) right," etc.-terms utterly insufficient to indicate the
precise elements involved. - In none of the books has any strict
analytical method been pursued. Some typical "definitions"
disclose at a glance how hopelessly inadequate they are to indicate
the varieties of jural relations actually included in each of the
various kinds of easements. The unfortunate fallacy consists
in treating as if it were a solid, unanalyzable unity that which
'Jones, Easements (1898) sec. I:
"An easement is a privilege without profit which one has for the benefit
of his land in the land of another."
Tiffany, Real Property (19o3) 677:
"An easement is a right, in one person, created by grant or its equivalent,
to do certain acts on another's land, or to compel such other to refrain
fron doing certain acts thereon, the right generally existing as an accessory
to the ownership of neighboring land, and for its benefit."
Mr. Justice Thompson, in Big Mountain Improvement Co.s Appeal
(1867) 54 Pa. 361, 369:
"This was but the grant of an easement although described to be in fee,
which is generally defined to be 'a liberty, privilege or advantage which
one may have in the lands of another without profit:' Gale & Whately on
Easements 6."
The usual definitions and explanations of "profits" and other "incor-
poreal" hereditaments are similarly deficient and unsatisfactory. Compare,
e. g., Tiffany, Real Property (1903) 678:
"An easement is to be distinguished from a profit cl prendre, which
signifies a right in a person to take a part of the soil belonging to another
person, or something growing or subsisting on or in the soil."
The most significant and distinguishing elements in the entire aggregate
of the "profit" owner are those which the books constantly fail to point
out, viz., the legal powers of acquiring ownership of severed parts of the
"servient" land by exercising the legal privileges of making physical
severance. Of course, rights (or claims) and immunities, as well as priv-
ileges and powers, constitute elements in the profit owner's "aggregate."
See post pp. 97 seq.
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is really a complex aggregate of many distinct jural relations,
actual and potential.' 0
Consider, for example, a right of way over Y's land Whiteacre,
the "servient" tenement, X being the owner of Blackacre, the
"dominant" tenement. Without attempting an exhaustive analy-
sis of this interest, it is clear that the most significant jural rela-
tions included in X's complex aggregate are as follows: First,
X has rights, or claims, against others,-Y and third parties,-
that they shall not interfere with his crossing of Whiteacre, as
e. g., by erecting an obstruction;"1 and all such other persons
are under respective correlative duties not to interfere, etc.
Second, the most striking jural relations in X's complex aggre-
gate consist of his legal privileges of crossing Whiteacre in
various ways (as by walking, riding or driving); i. e., his
privilege in any such case is the negation of the duty to stay
off which X would be under were it not for the special easement
facts distinguishing him from other individuals. Correlative to
X's privileges are the no-rights of Y; i. e., Y has no rights
that X should stay off. Though, unfortunately, the point is
generally overlooked, and sometimes, in effect, denied,' 2 these
"privilege-no-right" relations are as true jural relations as the
"right-duty" relations already referred to.' 3  Moreover, it is
"The same tendency is manifest in the usual attempts to analyze even
the most complex and intricate kinds of jural interests, such as equitable
trust interests, corporate ownership, etc. Compare as regards trusts,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
23 YAIE LAW JotRwAL, 16-i9; The Relations between Equity and Law
(1913) 1i MicH. L. REv. 537, 553; The Conflict of Equity and Law (1917)
26 YA=E LAw JouRNAL, 767-770; and, as regards the analysis of corporate
ownership, The Nature of Stockholders' Individual Liability for Corpora-
tion Debts (19o9) 9 COL. L. Rav. 285, 287 seq.; The Individual Liability
of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws (igio) io CoL. L. Rv. 283,
296-326.
u These are, of course, multital rights (so-called rights in rein), as con-
trasted with paucital rights (so-called rights in personam).
For an extended analysis and explanation of these conceptions and
terms-so often misunderstood-see Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning (917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 710.
For an explanation of the terms, jus in re and jus in re aliena, see Ibid.,
734 seq.
"See Pollock, Jurisprudence (2d ed., i9o4) 62; and cf. Del Vecchio,
Formal Bases of Law (tr. by Lisle, 1914) 166-182.
"See Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning
(913) 23 YALE LAw JoutRNAL, 16, 42, n. 59, criticising, inter alia, the views
expressed in Pollock, Jurisprudence (2d ed., x9o4) 62.
See also ante, p. 69, n. 8.
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the privilege elements in X's interest, involving an affirmative
activity on Y's land, Whiteacre, that cause his easement to be
classified as affirmative, in contrast to a negative easement, such
as that of light. Third, X has various legal powers: e. g., the
power, subject to certain limitations, to create in others, e. g.,
servants and guests, respective privileges of crossing Whiteacre;
the power to alienate his aggregate of relations by conveying it,
along with his main Blackacre interest, to M-such alienation
really consisting of the extinguishment of X's own relations
and the creation of new and corresponding relations in M ;14 and
the power to extinguish his aggregate of relations in favor of
Y, leaving no-rights (or no-claims), duties, liabilities and dis-
abilities in place of his previous interest, together with a cor-
responding transformation of jural relations as regards Y and
all third persons. Fourth, X has various legal immunities, the
term "immunity" being here used in the very definite sense of
non-liability or non-subjection to legal power on the part of
another person. Thus, e. g., X is free from the power of any
person, under ordinary conditions, to extinguish his easement
interest.
Passing from affirmative easements to those classified as nega-
tive, the typical case is the easement of light. In that case the
aggregate consists of rights, or claims, powers and immunities;
the significant thing being the absence of privileges to be
exercised by X through affirmative acts on Y's land.15
Coming nearer to the problem of the principal case, let us
consider two adjacent parcels, Brownacre, owned by J, and
Greenacre, owned by K. In the absence of special facts operat-
ing in favor of J or others, K has so-called "natural rights" to
lateral support; i. e., such rights, or claims, exist as ordinary
elements of K's aggregate of jural relations called "ownership
"'As regards the "alienation" of "legal interests," see the article already
cited (1913) 23 YALE, LAw JouRNAT, 16, 24, 45; also Professor Walter W.
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (igi6) 29 HAgv. L. REv. 816-
.837; The Alienability of Choses in Action--A Reply to Professor Williston
(917) 30 Hav. L. REv. 449-485.
15 Compare Holmes, in 3 Kent Com. *419, note (c):
"In general it is supposed that the duty of the servient owner is the
same as that of third persons in point of law, viz., to abstain from inter-
fering with a right in rem, although it is more onerous in point of fact, by
reason of his occupation of the land. See D. 43. 19. 3, sec. 5; Saxby v.
Manchester, Sheffield, &c., R. Co., L. M. 4 C. P. I98. But see Lawrence v.
Jenkins, L. R. 8 Q. B. 274."
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of Greenacre,"--being in no way dependent on special grant or
equivalent operative facts, such as reseration or prescription.
That is to say, K's right that J shall not, by removing the lateral
support, cause K's land to collapse is exactly of the same general
character as K's ordinary right that J, having no "right of way"
easement or other basis of privilege, shall not walk across
Greenacre.
Suppose, however, that K should, by instrument of grant
under seal, purport to create in J, his heirs and assigns, the
"right and privilege," of causing, through removal of support,
the collapse of I's land. Is there any reason why the aggregate
of relations so created should not be considered an "easement,"
and thus involve the application of the usual rules as to the
alienation of easements, that is, that easements appurtenant pass
ordinarily with the dominant estate even without express men-
tion,1 and, a fortiori, under a clause as to "appurtenances?"
How, if at all, does J's aggregate of jural relations concerning
and affecting Greenacre differ from X's aggregate of jural
relations called "right of way" over Whiteacre?
In the Greenacre case, as in the Whiteacre case, we can easily
discover right (claim) elements, privilege elements, power ele-
ments and immunity elements. The privilege is that of causing
the collapse of K's land through removal of his own soil and
concomitant change in the operation of natural forces on K's
land. The privilege is limited, as indicated, to causing collapse
in a particular mode, viz., through change in the operation of
natural forces through removal of J's own soil. The power
elements and immunity elements are equally obvious. Similarly,
there seem to be rights, or claims, corresponding to those involved
in X's right of way over Whiteacre. That is, since by the very
terms of the supposed grant to J, K has given him the "right
and privilege"'17 of removing lateral support, etc., the intentions
of the parties are clear: J has rights against K (and, by
analogy to a right of way, against third parties indiscriminately)
that they shall not interfere with the "exercise" of J's privilege,
that is with the physical activity bringing about a change in
natural forces against K's land. Such an aggregate of jural
" See Jones, Easements (I898), sec. 22, collecting the authorities at large.
"'In Penman v. Jones (1917, Pa.) ioo Atl. i043, it will be remembered,
the same terms, "right and privilege," were used in the deed from A to B.
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relations in J would thus seem to constitute an easement; and
authority is not wanting for this view."'
A precisely similar analysis is applicable to the operative facts
and resulting jural relations involved in Penman v. Jones?9 the
Pennsylvania case chiefly in view. By revolving Greenacre and
Brownacre ninety degrees on an axis, the former would become
the superjacent estate of B, and the latter would become the
subjacent estate of A (Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co.)
It is well settled in Pennsylvania, in accord with the authorities
at large, that on the original creation of a subjacent mineral
estate, either by grant or by exception, the owner of the super-
jacent estate acquires an ordinary, or "natural," right of surface
support corresponding to the right of lateral support already
considered 0
Thus in one of the latest cases on the subject, Youghiogheny
River Coal Co. v. Allegheny National Bank,21 the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania said, by Mr. Justice Mestrezat:
See Ryckman v. Gillis (1874) 57 N. Y. 68, 74. In this case Johnson, C.,
who dissented only on other grounds, said, at p. 78:
"But if the right to have support from adjoining land be not an ease-
ment, then what may be called the antagonistic right of removing your own
soil so as to diminish the support to which the adjoining owner was
entitled, is an easement affecting his land in favor of yours, and making
his land the servient tenement in that regard, and subject to the easement
of being deprived of its natural support That such an easement may be
acquired by grant or agreement of the parties is obvious, and has been
settled by repeated adjudications between surface owners and mine owners
underneath."
See also, to similar effect, Tiffany, Real Prop. (i9o3) 69o. Cf. Jones,
Easements (1898) sec. 589.
Compare also the easement of causing noises and vibrations harmful
to the owner of neighboring land. Sturges v. Bridgman (x878) ii Ch. D.
852.
19 (1917, Pa.) ioo Atl. io4.
J°fones v. Wagner (870) 66 Pa. 429, 434; Homer v. Watson (1875)
79 Pa. 242, 251; Coleman v. Chadwick (1875) 8o Pa. 8r; Williams v.
Hay (1888) 120 Pa. 485, 496; Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co.
(1896) 172 Pa. 566, 571.
The same principle is recognized and discussed in many of the later
Pennsylvania cases cited in the footnotes following.
The leading English case for the same doctrine is Humphries v. Brogden
(I85o) r2 Q. B. 739. See also the careful discussion in Howley Park Coal
& Cannel Co. v. London & N. W. Ry. Co. [I93] A. C. 11, 25, per Viscount
Haldane, L. C.
For the similar American cases at large, see Tiffany, Real Property
(z9o3) 672, n. 74.
1 (i9o5) 211 Pa. 319, 324.
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"If the owner of the whole fee conveys the coal in the
land in general terms, as in this case, retaining the residue
of the tract, the purchaser acquires the coal with the right
to mine and remove it, provided he does so without
injury to the superincumbent estate. His estate in the
coal, like that of the owner of the surface, is governed
by the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." The
owner of the surface is entitled to absolute support of his
land, not as an easement or right depending on a supposed
grant, but as a proprietary right at common law: Carlin
v. Chappel, IOI Pa. 348; :2 Snyder on Mines, sec. 1020."
But it is equally well settled in Pennsylvania, as in England,
that the "right and privilege" of letting down the surface can,
by apt words, be created in the owner of the subjacent estate
either through grant or through reservation. In the leading
Pennsylvania case deciding this point, Scranton v. Phillips,2 2 the
court said, by Mr. Justice Mercur:
"We see no reason why a person shall not be bound by
his agreement to exempt another from liability for dam-
ages in working a coal mine, as well as from liability for
damages resulting in the performance of any other kind
of labor. No rule or policy of law forbids it. The
undoubted intention of the parties to the contract was,
that Fellows might mine and remove the coal without any
obligation to support the surface or liability in case it
fell. It was well said by Justice Blackburn, in Snith v.
Darby et .l., Law Rep., 7 Q. B. 716, 'the man who grants
the minerals and reserves the surface is entitled to make
any bargain he likes; both parties are just as much at
liberty to make a bargain with reference to coals and
minerals, as to make a bargain with reference to anything
else.' The same rule applies when one grants the surface
and retains the minerals. In each case the question is,
did the parties agree there should be no obligation in
regard to support ?"
In a much later case, Miles v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 3 the
same proposition was enunciated even more dearly and definitely
by Mr. Justice Mestrezat:
"While, however, the owner of the surface is entitled
as of natural right to its support by the owner of the
subjacent mineral estate, it is equally well settled that the
common owner of both estates, or the owner of the fee
simple title to the tract of land, may by contract relieve the
owner of the mineral estate from any duty to support the
2 (188o) 94 Pa. 15, 22.
(i9o7) 217 Pa. 449, 451.
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surface and from liability for any injury or damage done
to it by mining and removing all the mineral. Being the
common owner of the whole title and, therefore, having
the jus disponendi, he may make any legal disposition of
the property he may desire. He may sell the coal and
retain the surface, or he may sell the surface and retain
the coal. In selling or leasing the coal, he may grant such
rights to the vendee or lessee as either may desire or deem
proper or necessary to remove the entire body of coal, as
well as such rights in, through or over the surface as may
be necessary for the same purpose. In other words, hav-
ing the absolute dominion over the property he may grant
such rights therein and thereto as may be agreed upon
and are stipulated for in the contract. This naturally
and logically follows from his ownership of the fee simple
title to the property."
Let us next consider the change in legal relations resulting
either from an alienation of the superjacent ("servient") estate
or from an alienation of the subjacent ("dominant") estate.
First, suppose the superjacent estate is transferred. Does the
transferee take subject to the "right and privilege" of the
subjacent owner? That is, does the transferee get an aggregate
of legal relations (rights, privileges, powers, and immunities)
equivalent only to those that his grantor had-and no greater?
Or, putting the same question in different form, does the trans-
feree take subject to the same no-rights, duties, liabilities, and
disabilities as his grantor was under? This question was, in
substance, presented in Kellert v. Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal
& Iron Co.24 In that case the original grant of the subjacent
estate ran to the grantee "his heirs and assigns." But the
language creating the privilege of letting down the surface did
not expressly purport to "bind" subsequent takers from the
grantor:
"And the said parties of the first part, do hereby release
all and every claim or claims for damages to the said land
caused by operating or working of said mines in a proper
manner."
25
(1909) 226 Pa. 27, 29.
= It seems nothing short of remarkable that in instruments involving
such important interests the draftsman should employ such loose and
inexact language as appears in so many of the deeds on which the
Pennsylvania decisions are founded.
The words, "release all and every claim or claims for damages to the
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Yet the court held, in effect, that the subsequent transferee
took the superjacent estate subject to similar limitations as
regards rights, privileges, powers, and immunities:
"On the trial of the cause as well as on the argument of
the present motion to lift the nonsuit, it was contended
that the release of damages contained in this deed bound
the grantors alone, and did not extend to their grantees,
the plaintiffs, since it is not in express words made to
apply to the grantors, 'their heirs and assigns.' In my
opinion this contention can find no support either in the
law or the facts in this case. The deed from Samuel
Craft and wife to Adrian Iselin in apt words conveys a
fee in the coal, and the subsequent related stipulations
and the release of damages to the surface that might result
from the removal of the coal are germane to and an
integral part of the grant. It was not necessary to repeat
the words 'heirs and assigns' in connection therewith to
make said stipulations and release apply to subsequent
grantees of the surface land."
Second, let us assume that the subjacent estate, being already
in existence along with the "right and privilege" of letting down
the surface, is transferred to another. As conceded by the
majority judges in Penman v. Jones, such "right and privilege"
may by apt words be granted along with the existing subjacent
estate.26  The previous Pennsylvania decisions supporting this
proposition all seem, however, to be cases in which the conveyance
to the subsequent grantee purported in express and specific terms
said land," purport, so far as direct meaning is concerned, to be a
present release (extinguishment) of a secondary right (or "claim") to
damages arising from breach of a primary right. Yet such secondary
rights (or "claims") could not arise until the future. Obviously, what is
really intended, so far as the grantor's rights, privileges, etc., are con-
cerned, is an extinguishment of primary rights, privileges, etc. In cor-
relative terms, the purpose is to create in the grantee of the subjacent
estate immediate primary privileges, rights (or claims), powers, and
immunities. It is of course entirely possible to express this purpose in
unmistakably clear and precise terms. No doubt instruments more intel-
ligently and artistically drawn in cases of this character would prevent
serious controversy and save enormous waste from litigation.
Compare post, p. 79, n. 30.
"'Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co. (1905) 212 Pa. 63, 64 (subsequent
grantee of the subjacent estate held to have privilege of letting down the
surface; terms of his grant do not appear in the report); Stilley v.
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to grant the "right and privilege" along with the subjacent
estate proper. Under such circumstances it was held both in
Stilley v. Buffalo Co.,2 7 and in Kirwin v. Del., L. & W. R. R.
Co."' that the "right and privilege" passed, so that the sub-
sequent grantee was privileged to let down the surface. It is
significant, however, that no emphasis was in either case placed
on the fact that specific terms had been employed for the pur-
pose of alienating the "right and privilege.' 29  Thus, in the
first case just mentioned Mr. Justice Elkin, speaking for the
court, rested the result, very justly, on a broad foundation, viz.,
the intentions of the original grantor and grantee of the subjacent
estate:
"Our cases relating to this question may very properly
be divided into three classes: i. Those relating to grants
of coal without any mention of damages to the surface
by mining and removing the same; 2. Those relating to
grants of coal coupled with mining rights and the waiver
of damages resulting by reason of the proper exercise of
the mining privileges; and, 3. Those cases in which the
grant of the coal together with mining rights is followed
either by an express waiver of damages to the surface
resulting from the removal of the coal, or by words im-
porting such a waiver. . . . In the cases last cited it was
expressly held that the rule giving to the owner of the
soil the right of surface support had no application in a
case in which the parties had otherwise covenanted. Like
any other right, the owner of the surface may waive the
right of surface support by his deed or covenant. It is
therefore just as well settled that a surface owner may
part with his right of surface support by a covenant to do
so, as it is that the servitude of support is imposed upon
the subjacent estate. The important question in cases of
this character is whether the surface owner by express
words or by necessary implication has waived the right of
Buffalo Co. (1912) 234 Pa. 492, 497 (deed to subsequent grantee of sub-
jacent estate contained express and specific terms granting the right and
privilege of letting down the surface) ; Kirwin v. Del., L. & W. R. R. Co.
(1915) 249 Pa. 98, ioo (same as in preceding case).
(1912) 234 Pa. 492, 497.
= (1915) 249 Pa.. 98, IOI.
" It is to be remembered that, as regards the Pennsylvania cases, the
"right and privilege" have generally, if not always, been granted or
reserved to the holder of the subjacent estates, "his heirs and assigns";
or else equivalent language has been used.
In Penman v. Jones, the original owner of the subjacent estate having
been a corporation, the reservation was to the grantor, "its successors and
assigns."
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surface support. The intention of the parties must and
should govern .... The mining privileges granted were
incident to the mining and removing of all the coal under-
lying the tract of land, and the covenant as to damages
was in these words, 'hereby waiving all damages aris-
ing therefrom. If this waiver referred to damages to
the land arising from the removal of all the coal, the case
at bar is squarely ruled by Kellert v. Coal & Iron Com-
pany, 226 Pa. 27....
"In that case as in this the waiver of damages related
to the land not included in the grant of the coal. . . . The
grantor conveyed all the coal and no doubt intended to
release all damages occasioned by the removal of it. As
we have hereinbefore pointed out the release of damages
in the present case related to the injuries resulting to
the land by the removal of the coal, just as the waiver in
the Kellert case above cited had reference to the land
there in question."30
In Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co."' there is an im-
portant dictum tending to show that the "right and privilege"
in question would ordinarily pass with the subjacent estate to a
subsequent grantee. Said Mr. Justice Mestrezat, in delivering the
opinion of the court:
"Equally true, however, is it that the owner in fee of
the entire estate may grant the mineral estate and by apt
words in the deed of conveyance may part with or release
his right to surface support, and where he does so his
grantee or those claiming through him may mine all the
coal even though it should result in the surface falling in.
The owner of the entire estate may likewise grant the
surface of the land and reserve the mineral estate with
' As to the adequacy of language of "covenant," "agreement," "waiver,"
"release," etc., to create easements, compare Mr. Justice Holmes, in Hogan
v. Barry (886) 143 Mass. 538:
"There is no doubt that an easement may be created by words sounding
in covenant. Bronson v. Coffin, io8 Mass. i75, 18o. If the seeming cove-
nant is for a present enjoyment of a nature recognized by the law as
capable of being conveyed and made an easement,--capable, that is to say,
of being treated as a jus in rem, and as not merely the subject of a
personal undertaking,-and if the deed discloses that the covenant is for
the benefit of adjoining land conveyed at the same time, the covenant must
be construed as a grant, and, as is said in Plowden, 308, 'the phrase of
speech amounts to the effect to vest a present property in you.' An ease-
ment will be created and attached to the land conveyed, and .will pass with
it to assigns, whether mentioned in the grant or not."
See also cases cited in io Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed., 1899)
414, n. I.
'(0914) 244 Pa. 592, 596.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
the right to mine and remove it without liability for any
injury or damage done to the surface, and in such case
the grantor or those claiming through him may mine and
remove all the coal without being compelled to support the
surface."
The language of the last three quotations all imports that the
"rights, privileges," etc., as to letting down the surface con-
stitute an integral part of the subjacent owner's interest, just
like the rights and privileges of "a right of way" appurtenant
to the subjacent estate.3 2 Penman v. Jones, however, is evidently
the first case to require or involve a more careful consideration
of the exact nature of the subjacent owner's "right and privi-
lege" and a classification of that form of legal interest either as
an "easement" or as something other than an easement. As
already intimated in dealing with a similar "right and privilege"
concerning withdrawal of lateral support, 3 it would seem that
in Penman v. Jones the "right and privilege" reserved to A, its
"successors and assigns" should have been treated as an ease-
ment, especially as regards the matter of alienation.
As Mr. Justice Moschzisker says in his dissenting opinion :'-
"How shall the character of that right be defined? If
it must be classed as an 'easement appurtenant,' then it
would pass by a subsequent conveyance of the mineral
estate. (Cathcart v. Bowman, 5 Pa. 317; Horn v. Miller,
136 Pa. 64o, 654, 2o At. 7o6, 9 L. R. A. 8io; Richmond
v. Bennett, 205 Pa. 470, 472, 55 At. i7; Held v. McBride,
3 Pa. Super. Ct. 155, I58; Citizens' Elec. Co. v. Davis,
44 Pa. Super. Ct. 138, i42; Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me.
381, 384, 6 At. 6; Winston v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 396,
402, 45 N. W. 958), unless some exceptional rule applies
to an easement of this particular kind. An easement 'is
generally defined to be a "liberty, privilege or advantage
which one may have in the lands of anbther without
'Compare Mr. Justice Mestrezat in Miles v. Penn. Coal Co. (i9o7)
217 Pa. 449, 451.
In this case the learned judge's language is such as to lump together, as
of the same nature, both a right of way and a "right and privilege" of
letting down the surface:
"In selling or leasing the coal, he may grant such rights to the vendee
or lessee as either may desire or deem proper or necessary to remove the
entire body of coal, as well as such rights in, through or over the surface
as may be necessary for the same purpose."
See ante, pp. 73-74
*4Penman v. Jones (1917) oo AUt. 1o43, IO47-io48.
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profit."' Big Mountain Improvement Co.'s App., 54 Pa.
361, 369. Jones on Easements, at page 4, states their
qualification thus:
'First, they are incorporeal; second, they are imposed
on corporeal property; third, they confer no right to a
participation in the profits arising from such property;
fourth, they are imposed for the benefit of corporeal
property; fifth, there must be two distinct tenements-
the dominant, to which the right belongs, and the servient
upon which the obligation rests. .. .'
"Thus it may be seen that the right created in the
grantor by the deed from A. to B. has all the attributes of
an easement appurtenant to the mineral estate vested in
the former. It is an incorporeal right attached to cor-
poreal property, and, when brought into legal existence,
generally speaking, it would pass upon a conveyance of
the latter under the general description of 'appurten-
ances.' Id., sec. 20 et seq., and cases hereinbefore cited."
Various authorities support the conclusion here suggested as
sound.35
'Rowbotham v. Wilson (1857) 8 E. & B. 123, affd. 8 H. L. Cas. 348.
Compare Aspden. v. Seddon (I875) IO Ch. App. 394, 402; Wilms v. Jess
(I88o) 94 Ill. 464, 468 (reasoning and dicta).
In Aspden v. Seddon, supra, Mellish, L. J., said:
"Now, by the deed, all mines and seams of coal, ironstone, and other
minerals are reserved to Stott, with full liberty, power, and authority for
Stott and his lessees 'to search for, get, win, take, cart and carry away
the same, and sell or convert to his or their own use the said excepted
mines, veins and seams of coal, cannel, and ironstone and other mines
and minerals, or any of them, or any part or parts thereof, at pleasure,
and to do all things necessary for effectuating all or any of the aforesaid
purposes.' . . . If the sentence had stopped there, these words would be
consistent with the construction that the mineral owner may take away
every part of the minerals, provided he can do so without violating the
surface-owner's right to support, but not otherwise, and some further
words would be necessary to prove that the intention of the parties was
that the mineral owner should be at liberty to take away the whole or any
part of the minerals, notwithstanding he might thereby let down the surface
or any buildings thereon. Accordingly the Respondents rely on the words
which immediately follow in the deed as sufficient for this purpose.
Those words are, 'but without entering upon the surface of the said
premises, or any part thereof, so that coinpensation in money be made by
him or them for all damage that should be done to the erections on the
said plot by the exercise of any of the said excepted liberties or in con-
sequence thereof.'
"As by the express wbrds of the reservation the mine-owner in working
the mines is not to enter upon the plot of land conveyed- by the deed. the
damage to the buildings for which compensation is to be given must be
damage to the buildings caused by the removal of the minerals reserved,
and therefore it follows that a right to remove all the minerals, notwith-
standing the buildings above might be thereby damaged, was one of the
liberties reserved by the deed....
"It was argued on the part of the Appellants, that the right to com-
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The contrary opinion of the majority judges in Penman v.
Jones seems to be founded on four interesting and crucial points
which may be indicated and discussed as follows: (a) The
court's reliance on cases involving an original "severance" of
the superjacent and subjacent estates; (b) The court's confusing
of the subjacent owner's legal privilege of removing surface
support, etc., with the superjacent owner's right (in the sense
of "legal claim") that another person shall not remove the sur-
face support; (c) The court's reasons for refusing to treat the
interest as an easement; (d) The court's explanation of the
interest as an "irrevocable license." Each of these matters must
here be treated with as great brevity as may be consistent with
clearness:
(a) The court's reliance on cases involving an original "sever-
ance" of the superjacent and subjacent estates. The court begins
its argument by quoting from a series of cases running from
Jones v. Wagner 8 to Youghiogheny River Coal Company v.
Allegheny National Bank,8 7 the court's quotation from the latter
case having already been reproduced at an earlier point in the
present discussion.88 All of such cases announce merely the well
settled doctrine that the holder of the superjacent estate, at the
moment of "severance," has, apart from grant or reservation, etc.,
a so-called "natural" right of surface support; or, correlatively,
that the owner of the subjacent estate has immediately the duty
of not causing collapse through removal of support: that is, has
no privilege of causing collapse, etc. These cases, which are in
entire accord with the authorities at large, would seem very diffi-
cult of application to the situation in Penman v. Jones. In that
pensation was merely an additional remedy given to the surface-owner in
case his-buildings were damaged, but did not give the mine-owner a right
to get the minerals in such a way as to cause damage to the buildings.
It seems to us, however, clear that the compensation is given for damage
caused by rightful acts which the deed makes lawful, and not for damage
caused by wrongful acts. The exercise of any of the excepted liberties
must surely apply to rightful acts, and not to wrongful acts, because it is
absurd to suppose that a liberty is reserved to do wrongful acts. If liberty
is reserved to do the act complained of, that reservation, as between the
parties and those claiming under them, makes the act rightful."
In Rowbotham v. Wilson, supra, the judges, both of the Exchequer
Chamber and of the House of Lords deliberately and definitely character-
ized the interest in question as an easement. The important passages to
this effect are quoted post, pp. 90-91.
"$ones v. Wagner (i87o) 66 Pa. 429, 434.
1 (i905) 211 Pa. 319, 324.
' For the court's quotation from this case, see ante, pp. 74-75.
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case the subjacent estate had already been "severed" for eighteen
years; and the "right and privilege" of letting down the sur-
face, having at the moment of "severance" been created as an
integral part of the subjacent owrner's aggregate of legal relations,
had had a similar period of life. The transfer of the subjacent
estate and its accompanying "right and privilege" was, at that
moment, a matter admittedly concerning only the subjacent
owner and his transferee: the superjacent owner had no power to
prevent the alienation of the "right and privilege." Whatever we
call the "right and privilege," its transfer along with the sub-
jacent estate proper would be like the transfer of an existing
easement, not like the creation of a new easement at file moment
of severance.
Yet the majority opinion, immediately after the quotation from
Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny National Bank,87
continues as follows:
"In the light of the foregoing authorities, it is clear
that there is nothing in the language of the deed from the
Lackawanna Iron & Coal Company to the steel company,
which can be regarded as indicating an intention to convey
the minerals free from liability upon the part of the pur-
chaser to support the surface in their removal. No such
privilege follows from the mere conveyance of coal,
machinery, fixtures, tools, etc., with the 'hereditaments
and appurtenances' belonging thereto. The conveyance
of 'all the estate, right, title, interest, benefit, property,
claim and demand whatsoever' of the grantor, is properly
referable to the subject-matter of the grant, to wit, the
coal conveyed, and does not necessarily amount to a
waiver of the right of the grantor to insist upon support
being left for the surface."
(b) The court's confusing of the subjacent owner's legal privi-
lege of removing surface support, etc., with the superjacent
owner's right (in the sense of legal claim) that another person
shall not remove surface support, etc. Let us consider certain
passages from the court's opinion in juxtaposition:
(i) "No such privilege" [of removing surface support ("free
from liability")] "follows from the mere conveyance," etc.
(From above quotation.)
(2) "The conveyance . . . is properly referable to . . . the
coal conveyed and does not necessarily amount to a waiver of
the right of the grantor to insist upon support being left for the
surface." (From above quotation.)
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(3) "The insertion" etc. . . . "indicates an intention upon the
part of the grantor not to waive the right of support as to other
lots" [including superjacent lot in question]. (Later passage.)
(4) "In the present case, whatever right" [privilege] "the
coal company retained to interfere with the surface support was
relinquished by it to the Scranton Trust Company" [D], etc.
(Still later passage.)
This is not simply a matter of terms, as such: it is a matter
of basic legal conceptions constituting the very essence of the
court's reasoning.39 In the first and fourth passages, the court
is dealing with "privilege-no-right" relations; in the second
and third passages with "right-duty" relations. More speci-
fically, in the first and fourth passages the question is whether
the "privilege" of A, the Coal Company, (the correlative "no-
right" being in B, the superjacent owner) has been alienated
to another person-in passage "(i)" to C, the Steel Company,
in passage "(4)" to D, the Trust Company. But in the second
and third passages that question is treated as identical with the
question whether "the grantor" of the subjacent estate has made
a "waiver" of "the right" [= claim] "of support" as to B's
lot.4 0
As, of course, the ownership of the superjacent lot in question
was in B at the time the conveyance of the subjacent estate was
made, it is clear that the grantor of the subjacent lot had no
"right of surface support" to waive or extinguish. It is clear
that he had no such right, or claim, against himself; and it is
equally clear that he had no such "naked" rights, or claims,
against C (the Steel Company) or anyone else. Such grantor
" Similar serious difficulties as regards the application of fundamental
legal conceptions are to be found in Graff Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal
Company (914) 244 Pa. 592, 598.
" Elsewhere in the opinion, Penman v. Jones (1917) ioo Atl., at 1o46,
more baffling language is used:
"The Scranton Coal Company has no direct interest in this case; but,
considering that its rights might be affected by the conclusion herein
reached, it presented a brief, and has been represented by counsel, who
among other points raised, have contended that, if the deed from the coal
company to the steel company did not pass to it the waiver of liability
for failure to support the surface which had been retained by the coa
company, then the deed to the trust company was also insufficient to
release or reconvey that waiver to the owner of the surface. But this con-
tention overlooks the fact that the law gives to the owner of the surface
the right to subjacent support of his land in its natural condition, as a
result of, and as an incident to that ownership."
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had (apart from various powers and immunities not now neces-
sary to be considered) merely the "right and privilege" of
removing the surface support (and causing damage thereby),
i. e., the privilege of removing support, and the rights, or claims,
that all others, including B, the superjacent owner, should not
interfere with his privileged acts of removing such support, etc.
These rights, or claims, against interference are, of course,
entirely different from any supposed right, or claim, that such
surface support should not be removed. Similarly, in the "right
of way" case heretofore put, with X owning the dominant tene-
ment, Blackacre, and Y owning the servient- tenement, White-
acre, it is clear that X's privileges of crossing Whiteacre and
his rights of non-interference against Y and others are entirely
distinct from Y's rights, or claims, that others than X shall not
trespass on Whiteacre.
Very possibly, had the learned Pennsylvania court seen that,
as regards the conveyance of the subjacent estate to C (the Steel
Company) it was not dealing with "the grantor's" natural
"right of surface support," the decision of the case would have
gone the other way.41 A similar suggestion may, indeed, be
ventured as regards the earlier case of Graff Furnace Co. v.
Scranton Coal Co.,42 involving a somewhat different question of
great importance to mining interests. In any event, it seems
altogether likely that in Penman v. Jones, had there been a
more careful discrimination and application of fundamental legal
conceptions as above specified, the court would have realized
the inapplicability of the series of cases running from Jones v.
Wagner43 to Youghiogheny River Coal Co. v. Allegheny National
Bank.4 '3
(c) The court's reasons for refusing to treat the "right and
privilege," as an easement. For the proposition that the "right
and privilege" of letting down the surface was not an easement,
the majority judges cite no authorities; and their own argument
- Compare Mr. Justice Holmes, in The Path of the Law (1897) io HAv.
L. REv. 456, 474-475:
"Therefore, it is well to have an accurate notion of what you mean by
law, by a right, by a duty, by malice, intent, and negligence, by ownership,
by possession, and so forth. I have in mind cases in which the highest
courts seem to me to have floundered because they had no clear ideas on
some of these themes."
(1914) 244 Pa. 592, 598.
"See ante, p. 74, n. 20.
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is as follows, the various portions thereof being consecutively
numbered and paragraphed by the present writer so as to facili-
tate subsequent reference:
"(i) This stipulation cannot properly be regarded as
the creation of another easement appurtenant to the min-
eral estate, which would pass merely with its conveyance.
The stipulation for the right to remove the coal without
liability for injury to the surface did not have the effect
of retaining in the grantor any interest outside of the
coal, in the land which was being conveyed. It did not
authorize the grantor to do anything upon the land of
the surface owner, but its effect was merely to absolve
the owner of the coal from responsibility for injurious
consequences which might follow the removal of the coal.
The stipulation may fairly be considered as being a license
to do the desired act, that is, to let down the surface, if
necessary, in order to remove the coal. It was authority
to do an act affecting the land, without, however, confer-
ring upon the licensee any estate in the land. An easement
is always an estate in the land.
"(2) But 'a license properly passeth no interest, nor
alters or transfers property in anything, but only makes
an action lawful, which without it had been unlawful.'
Thomas v. Sorrell, Vaughan's Rep. (Eng.) 330, 351. It is
distinguished in this from an easement. Jones on Ease-
ments, 64, 65. The only effect of the stipulation in this
case would be to make lawful the letting down of the
surface, which otherwise would be unlawful. Further
than that, it could not go.
"(3) Its force would be spent with the removal of the
coal.
"(4) The license in this case, being coupled with a grant
of the coal, or rather with the reservation of the coal, was
irrevocable by the owner of the surface, and was assign-
able by the licensee.
"(5) Beyond question the coal company had power to
assign to the steel company its right to remove the coal
without liability for injury to the surface, but it did not
see fit to do so."
In this argument the first point to emerge is that "the right
and privilege" did "not authorize the grantor to do anything upon
the land of the surface owner," and that it was only "author-
ity to do an act affecting the land." The mere assembling of the
two parts of this proposition would seem sufficient to show how
attenuated is the objection urged. The privilege of causing the
surface owner's land to collapse would seem a more substantial
affirmative privilege than the privilege of walking "upon" the
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surface of the subjacent owner's land. For the living law affect-
ing practical coal miners the distinction laid hold of appears,
at best, purely arbitrary: it has no teleological basis in relation
to the general purposes intended to be achieved by the law of
easements. Still looking at the privilege elements alone, we may
profitably compare the well-recognized easement of making dis-
agreeable noises on one's own land so as to cause annoyance to
the owner of adjacent land.4 It is interesting, in the same
"See Sturges v. Bridgman (1879) ii Ch. D. 852, 857, 858, 864. In this
case the claim of easement by prescription was rejected by the court; but
it is recognized in the opinions of Jessel, M. R., and Thesiger, L. J., that
such an easement could be created by grant. Jessel, M. R., said, at
pp. 857-858:
"There are really all sorts of difficulties in the defendant's way. In
the first place the easement must be an easement 'upon, over, or from.'
Now the noise in question, in my opinion, is not properly described in that
way. No doubt the waves by which the sound is distributed pass over
the plaintiff's land; there is no question about that. But is that an ease-
ment enjoyed 'upon, over, or from any land?' Well, I think it is not.
That appears not only from the natural meaning of the words, but from
authority. . . . He claims the right of setting the air or ether in motion
by something or other that he does upon his own property."
Thesiger, L. J., said, at p. 864:
"The passage of water from his land on to yours may be physically
interrupted, or may be treated as a trespass and made the ground of action
for damages, or for an injunction, or both. Noise is similar to currents
of air and the flow of subterranean and uncertain streams in its practical
incapability of physical interruption, but it differs from them in its
capability of grounding an action."
Compare also, as regards noises and odors, Elliotson v. Feetham (1835)
2 Bing. N. C. 134, 137; Bliss v. Hall (1838) 4 Bing. N. C. 183, 186;
Ball v. Ray (1873) L. R. 8 Ch. App. 467, 471.
Such an easement is generally classified as an affirmative or positive
one. See, e. g., Leake, Uses and Profits of Land (1888) 193:
"The transmission and diffusion of noise or noxious vapours over the
servient tenement is a positive easement which cannot be effectually
opposed by physical obstruction; the only mode of resisting it is by
action, when it amounts to an actionable nuisance."
Compare also Salmond, Torts ( 4th ed., 1916) -6o-26i:
"A positive easement is a right to enter upon the servient land or to do
some other act in relation thereto which would otherwise be illegal. A
negative easement is a right that the owner of the servient land shall
refrain from doing some act which he would otherwise be entitled to do-
e. g., the erection of a building which would obstruct his neighbour's lights.
In other words, the obligation of the owner of the servient land consists
either in patiendo (i. e., in suffering the dominant owner to do an act on
or in relation to the servient land) -or in non faciendo (i. e., in refraining
from doing some act on the servient land). In the first case the servitude
is positive, and in the second negative. ...
"The chief recognized easements are . . . (6) rights to do some act
which would otherwse amount to a nuisance to the servient land."
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connection, to notice the easement (as distinguished from
"natural" right) of lateral or subjacent support for a building
leaning against or resting upon a structure belonging to the
servient land. 45 Turning from privileges to rights (claims),
Compare Lord Chancellor Selborne, in Dalton v. Angus (i88i) L. R.
6 App. Cas. 740, 793-795:
"I think it clear that any such right of support to a building, or part of
a building, is an easement; and I agree with Lindley, J., and Bowen, J.,that it is both scientifically and practically inaccurate to describe it as oneof a merely negative kind. What is support? The force of gravitycauses the superincumbent land, or building, to press downward uponwhat is below it, whether artificial or natural; and it has also a tendencyto thrust outwards, laterally, any loose or yielding substance, such asearth or clay, until it meets with adequate resistance. Using the language
of the law of easements, I say that, in the case alike of vertical and oflateral support, both to land and to buildings, the dominant tenement im-poses upon the servient a positive and a constant burden, the sustenance
of which, by the servient tenement, is necessary for the safety and stabilityof the dominant. It is true that the benefit to the dominant tenementarises, not from its own pressure upon the servient tenement, but fromthe power of the servient tenement to resist that pressure, and from itsactual sustenance of the burden so imposed. But the burden and itssustenance are reciprocal, and inseparable from each other, and it can
make no difference whether the dominant tenement is said to impose, or
the servient to sustain, the weight.
"Lord Campbell in Humphries v. Brogden referred to the servitude
.oneris ferendi (applied in the law of Scotland to a house divided into
'flats' belonging to different owners), as apt to illustrate the general lawof vertical support. The servitude so denominated (ut vicinus oneravicini sustineat) in the Roman law was exclusively 'urban,' that is,
relative to buildings, whether in town or country; and the instances ofit given in the Digest refer to rights of support acquired by one proprietorfor his building, or part of it, upon walls belonging to an adjoining pro-prietor: Inst. lib. 2, tit. 3; Dig. lib. 8, tit. 2, sects. 24, 25, 33; also tit. 5,sects. 6, 8. But, in principle, the nature of such a servitude must be thesame, whether it is claimed against a building on which another structuremay wholly or partly rest, or against land from which lateral or vertical
support is necessary for the safety and stability of that structure. . . .
"The pressure of the dominant tenement, in the case of support, is uponthe soil of another man's land, and I can see no material difference betweenthis and 'something positive done or used in the soil of another man'sland.'"
Compare to similar effect, Lord Watson, at p. 831.
The above quotation seems, for present purposes, not without signifi-
cance and interest even if one must think that there is in Lord Selborne's
opinion an unfortunate failure to discriminate between "right" and
"privilege" elements in the various easements that he discusses. Theprivilege of pressure against the neighboring soil would doubtless exist
as a "natural" or ordinary privilege quite independently of any easement
proper.
See, to this effect, Mr. Justice Lindley and Mr. Justice Bowen, S. C., L. R.6 App. Cas. 740, 764, 784. As Lord Bowen says, at p. 784:
"There is certainly no case which decides that this pressure gives riseto a right of action on the neighbour's part, and practical reasons of
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the court apparently overlooks, and certainly ignores, the fact that
the subjacent owner was, at the time of severance, granted, in
express terms, rights (claims) as well as privileges-the "right
and privilege," etc. That is, as in the case of a right of way,
the subjacent owner would have rights, or claims, that the
superjacent owner and third parties should refrain from dis-
turbance of the exercise of his privileges of doing that which
might cause the collapse of the superjacent owner's land. If it
were not for these "right (claim)" elements in the subjacent
owner's interest, very possibly the superjacent owner might,
through operations conducted partly on his own land, prevent the
subjacent owner's removal of surface support. These rights, or
claims, of the subjacent owner correspond, pro tanto, to the
negative rights constituting the chief elements in the ordinary
easement of light.
A second point urged in the Pennsylvania court's argument is
that "its force" [that is the force of the stipulation for the
"right and privilege" of letting down the surface] "would be
spent with the removal of the coal." The suggestion seems to
be that the indefinite duration of the "right and privilege" tends
to show that no "estate" and hence no "easement" was created
in favor of the subjacent owner. But it is dear that even an
easement may exist as a freehold interest of uncertain duration;'"
convenience may be adduced against such a surmise, although it might
perhaps be argued that an action ought on principle to lie against, and
an injunction be obtainable to restrain, the man who is actually availing
himself of his neighbour's soil and using it in a manner which in twenty
years will be evidence of the acquisition of a right so to do."
" See Hewlins v. Shippam (1826) 5 B. & C. 221, 228, per Bayley, B.:
"The declaration claimed the right as a license and authority granted to
the plaintiff's landlords, their heirs and assigns, to make the drain, and
have the foul water pass from their scullery through the drain across the
defendant's yard. One of the counts claimed it indefinitely, without fixing
any limits; others restricted it either to the time the defendant should
continue possessed of his yard or house, or so long as it should be
requisite for the convenient occupation of the plaintiff's house; some
stated, as part of the consideration that defendant's landlord should do
some repairs to the defendant's premises; others did not. Now, what is
the interest these counts stated? A freehold interest.'
An easement may even exist merely as an interest "for years." As said
by Strong, J., in Huff v. McCauley (1866) 53 Pa. St 2o6, 210:
"All easements and profits a prendre may be held for life, in fee, or for
years."
See, in accord, Alderson, B., in Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M. & W.
838, 843.
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so that it is difficult to see the force of the suggested objection.
As the "right and privilege" was reserved to the owner of the
subjacent estate, "its successors and assigns," there was clearly
an attempt to create an interest in fee; and the uncertainty of
possible duration would seem immaterial.
Neither of the two points directly urged in Penman v. Jones
to show that the "right and privilege" in question could not
be an easement is supported in any case cited by the Pennsylvania
court; and such authorities as have been observed by the present
writer are opposed in reasoning or in decision.
The leading English case is Rowbotham v. Wilson; 7 and the
following passages are instructive:
Bramwell, B.: "The first question is, Can there be a
right to take the mines and remove all support from the
surface? . . .I cannot see how, if there may be a grant
of mines, and of the right to enter, sink shafts, and work,
there may not be such a grant as that contended for here.
Nor can I see how, if a grant of the right of unobstructed
light and air, or of support of the soil, to an adjoining
owner, would be good, a grant of such a right as claimed
here would not be. . . . But another objection is taken.
It is said that all easements suppose a right exercised over
the servient tenement: even in the case of lights it is the
passage of the rays of light and of air; and in the support
of the neighbouring soil it is its continuance in its place;
and that the claim of the defendant here is not to do
something on the plaintiff's land, but merely not to be sued
for what he does on his own. It is no answer to this
objection to say that it is exceedingly subtle. It certainly
would be strange if such a right could not be given with
a grant of an estate in the mines, but could to a licensee;
and yet to the latter the objection would not apply. And
I think the true answer to it (assuming the defendant
claims an easement) is, that the rules which are applicable
to the owners adjoining vertically, which is the natural
order, are not applicable where there is an unusual order
of things, viz. a division of horizontal ownership. I think,
therefore, such a right may exist. .... "
Martin, B.: "In the present case, the Commissioners
and Samuel Pears, in the same instrument by which
the former executed their powers, the latter under his
hand and seal, for a valuable consideration to himself,
declared that the mines below the land allotted to him
should belong to Henry Howlette in fee simple, and his
own lands be subject to the incident or quality that the
(1857) 8 E. & B. 123; affirmed 8 H. L. Cas. 348.
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owner of the mines should not be responsible for any
injury to the surface consequent upon the working of
them. In my opinion, the incident was lawfully created,
and attached to the estate of Samuel Pears; and that he
and all persons claiming under him took the estate subject
to it."
Williams, I.: "But it cannot, I think, be doubted that,
if an owner of land with subjacent mines were to grant
away the mines together with the power of winning the
minerals, without regard to any injury done thereby to
the surface, such a grant would be good, and would bind
the inheritance, and his estate in the surface would pass
to his assigns abridged, to that extent, of the right of
support from the minerals, whatever the nature of that
right may be. Hence it seems to follow that it is com-
petent for the owner of the surface of land effectually to
curtail by grant in favour of the owner of the subjacent
mines, the right to support therefrom."
Lord Wensleydale: "And supposing this power is not
to be considered as given by the act of the. Commissioners,
but only by the contract of the parties, Pears' covenant,
he being seised in fee by virtue of the award, would
certainly operate as a grant, by him, to Howlette (who,
at the same instant, took the fee simple in the mines), of
the power to get the minerals, and to disturb the surface
of his own land for that purpose by winning the mines
below from some adjoining land or bed of coal.
"I do not feel any doubt that this was the proper subject
of a grant, as it affected the land of the grantor; it was
a grant of the right to disturb the soil from below, and
to alter the position of the surface, and is analogous to
the grant of a right to damage the surface by a way over
it; and it was admitted, at your Lordships' bar, that there
is no authority to the contrary."
In Rycknzan v. Gillis,4 a New York case concerning lateral
support, Johnson, C., who dissented only on points not now
involved, expressed views in accord with the English cases:
"But if the right to have support from adjoining land
be not an easement, then what may be called the antago-
nistic right of removing your own soil so as to diminish
the support to which the adjoining owner was entitled,
is an easement affecting his land in favor of yours, and
making his land the servient tenement in that regard, and
subject to the easement of being deprived of its natural
support. That such an easement may be acquired by
grant or agreement of the parties is obvious, and has been
(874) 57 N. Y. 68, 78.
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settled by repeated adjudications between surface owners
and mine owners underneath. Rowbotham v. Wilson and
Snart v. Morton are instances establishing further that
the party claiming the ordinary rule not to be applicable
must establish its renunciation by the other party."
(d) The court's explanation of the "'right and privilege" of
letting down the surface as an "irrevocable license." The limita-
tions of space forbid here any attempt to discuss comprehensively
and thoroughly the numerous and troublesome classes of cases
commonly associated with the chameleon-hued term, "license."
Like the terms "res gestae" and "estoppel," "license" may be
said to be a word of convenient and seductive obscurity; and the
task of dealing at all adequately with the intricate and confused
subject would, in and of itself, require a long article.49 In this
place, therefore, only a few suggestions may be ventured-with
particular reference, of course, to paragraphs "2" and "4" of
the above-quoted argument from Penman v. Jones.
In spite of such ambiguities as attach to the term "license,"
it would seem that the court's effort to fit that legal category to
the "right and privilege" of letting down the superjacent land
encounters not only the supposed objections to its being con-
sidered an easement,50 but also several additional ones.
" Many of the difficulties would be removed if effort were made to con-
fine the term "license" to that group of operative facts which constitute
a "mere permission" to do or cause, or not to do or cause, a given thing.
Instead of this, the term is rapidly shifted about by lawyers and courts,--
usually even by the more careful writers,--so as to cover not only more
complex groups of operative facts, but also the jural relations flowing
either from a "mere permission" or from such more complex sets of
facts. See, e. g., Salmond, Torts (4th ed., i916) sec. 76 (compare the
usage in paragraphs "z" and "2").
For more general consideration of these difficulties, see (1913) 23 Y=LE
LAw JOuRNAL, 16, 2o, 44; and compare (1917) 26 YALE LAw JoURNAL,
710, 725, n. 34; 755, n. 9o.
11 In directly negativing the contention that the "right and privilege"
constituted an easement, the court said that the "stipulation" did "not
authorize the grantor to do anything upon the land of the surface owner,"
and that it was only "authority to do an act affecting the land." If any
distinction of this kind is to be pressed, has the category of license any
greater chance?
A typical definition is to be found in Tiffany, Real Property (19o3)
678:
"A license given to a person to do something on the land of another
should be carefully distinguished from an easement. A license is a mere
permission to do something on another's land."
A so-called "license" resulting, when "executed," in the extinguishment
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Quoting the well-known dictum of Vaughan, C. J., in Thomas
v. Sorrell," ' the Pennsylvania court says, inter alia: "An ease-
ment is always an estate in the. land. But 'a license properly
passeth no interest, nor alters or transfers property in anything,'"
etc.,--the further point being that the "right and privilege" of
letting down the surface is a "license," hence not an "interest,"
and hence also not an easement. It is clear, however, that in
the passage quoted Chief Justice Vaughan was referring exclu-
sively to a simple case not at all like that of Penman v. Jones.
This is shown impressively by the examples which the learned
chief justice himself gives immediately after the words quoted
by the Pennsylvania court:
"A dispensation or licence properly passeth no interest,
nor alters or transfers property in any thing, but only
makes an action lawful which without it had been unlaw-
ful. As a licence to go beyond the seas, to hunt in a man's
park, to come into his house, are only actions, which
without licence, had been unlawful.
"But a licence to hunt in a man's park, and carry away
the deer kill'd to his own use; to cut down a tree in a
man's ground and to carry it away the next day after to
his own use, are licences as to the acts of hunting and
cutting down the tree; but as to the carrying away of
the deer kill'd, and tree cut down, they are grants.
I "So to licence a man to eat my meat, or to fire the wood
in my chimney to warm him by, as to the actions of eating,
firing my wood and warming him, they are licences; but
it is consequent necessarily to those actions that my
property be destroyed in the meat eaten, and in the wood
burnt, so as in some cases by consequent and not directly,
and as its effect, a dispensation or licence may destroy
and alter the property:'
of an existing easement is, of course, to be distinguished. Such a
"license," for example, when given by the owner of an easement of light,
extinguishes, before execution, pro tanto, and, after execution, in toto,
the rights or claims of the easement owner, so far as the particular
obstruction is concerned. But such extinguishment amounts simply to a
new creation ("restoration") of the former "natural" privilege or privi-
leges of the owner of the servient tenement See Winter v. Brockwell
(x8o7) 8 East, 3o8 (as explained by Bayley, B., in Hewlins v. Shippatn
(1826) 5 B. & C. 22y, 233); Morse v. Copeland (1854, Mass.) 2 Gray,
302.
It is obvious, moreover, that such "natural" privileges, on being thus
"restored," would pass, even without express mention, to any subsequent
grantee of the estate of which they are constituent elements.
51 (1672) Vaughan, 330, 351.
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Suppose that R says to S, "I give you permission to walk
across my land, Longacre." This language, in and of itself,
purports merely to create in S the privilege, or, more strictly,
series of privileges, of walking across R's land.52  In correlative
terms, R's rights that S stay off are extinguished, and no-rights
substituted. The important point is that the permission con-
stitutes a grant to S of privileges alone: S is not granted any
accompanying rights (or claims) that R or other persons shall
not interfere with S's entering on the land, Longacre, and walk-
ing across. If, therefore, S succeeds in entering on the land, no
rights (or claims) of R are violated; but, if, on the other hand,
R closes the gate in the high stone wall, or bars the one and
only path midway, no rights (or claims) of S are violated ;53
and so also if some third party locks the gate or bars the path
half way across Longacre.54 Further than that, it is assumed,
' Of course the creation of such privilege or privileges amounts, in other
words, to an extinguishment of S's duty or duties to stay off R's land.
'See, for a full explanation of this matter (1913) 23 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, I6, 35 seq.
" Compare Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M. & W. 837; Hill v. Tupper
(1863) 2 H. & C. 121, also cases cited in comment entitled, Right of Ticket-
holder to Recover in Tort (1917) 26 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 395. But cf.
Case v. Webber (185o) 2 nd. io8.
In Hill v. Tupper, supra, no doubt the deed of grant was intended to
create a substantial interest-an "easement in gross"; and the explanation
of the actual decision lies in the fact that, so far as pure "legal"
doctrine was concerned, such an interest in gross could not be created in
England. See Ackroyd v. Smith (185o) io C. B. 164. Compare a very
recent case, Sports & General Press Agency v. "Our Dogs" Publishing Co.
(1916) 2K. B. 880; affd. (917) 61 S. J. (C. A.) 299.
In Wood v. Leadbitter, supra, the intentions of the parties were evidently
similar,-that is the unsealed ticket to the race course was intended to
grant both "irrevocable" privileges and "irrevocable' rights; but that
purpose failed both because, even if the intended interest were permissible
though not "coupled with a grant," the common law would require a
deed for the creation of such an "incorporeal" interest (even "for years"),
and because such an interest was not deemed a permissible one when not
coupled with a grant such as that involved in a profit or such as that
exemplified by Wood v. Manley (1839) 1I A. & E. 34 (see post, p. 97, n.
58a, and p. ioo). It would seem, also, that-the plaintiff's pleading was
faulty, his replication of "leave and license" as of the time of the battery
not being sustained by the facts.
For the later English authorities concerning an unsealed .written permis-
sion given for consideration and expressed to be for a continuous period,
definite or indefinite, see the important case of Hurst v. Pictures Co., Ltd.
[1915] I K. B. 1, involving a theatre ticket and .depending on the "con-
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in accordance with the actually existing law, that R, instead of
exercising his physical power of closing the gate or barring the
path, might exercise his legal power of extinguishing S's series
of privileges: that is, R might simply say to S, "I withdraw
my permission."
What shall we say of this "uncompanioned" "privilege-no-
right" relation (or series of such relations) thus vested in S sub-
ject to the liability of being extinguished by R's exercise of his
legal power of "revocation ?" Was Chief Justice Vaughan strictly
correct in asserting, in effect, that a mere privilege of this kind
is not an "interest" or "property" in land? Very likely, as
Thomas v. Sorrell was decided in 1672, some years before the
Statute of Frauds, he put it so on the assumption that, if it were
recognized as an "interest" in land, a deed would be requisite
to create such a privilege, just as in the usual case of "incor-
poreal" interests.55 Possibly also, as is so often the case even
at the present day, he failed to see that a "privilege-no-right"
relation is as true a legal relation and advantage as is a "right-
duty" relation.5
But, whatever his reasons, it is submitted that his statement is,
strictly and analytically considered, erroneous; and that it has
had its full measure of influence in confusing the vast number
of later judicial discussions and decisions relating to the subject.
The "privilege-no-right" relation of S or, a fortiori, a series
of such relations seems indeed to be an "interest" in land,
although it be unaccompanied by rights (or claims) and even
though S be under a liability of having his privilege or privileges
divested as already indicated. If, for example, M were a judg-
ment debtor and his land, Redacre, were about to be sold by the
sheriff, M's privileges concerning Redacre would be substantial
elements in his total ownership or interest, even in spite of the
liability of their being divested by the exercise of the sheriff's
power under the writ of execution.
If all this be so, it would seem that the more accurate and
satisfactory way to meet the supposed objection as to a deed
flict" of substantive "legal" and "equitable" rules and the determining of
their "net effect" under the Judicature Acts.
For explanation of the latter, see the writer's articles. The Relations
between Equity and Law (1913) x MI CH. L. REv. 537; and The Conflict
of Equity and Law (1917) 26 YALE LAw JOuRNAL, 767, 77o.
'See Hewlins v. Shippam (1826) 5 B. & C. 221, 229; Wood v. Lead-
bitter (1845) 13 M. & W. 838. See also preceding note.
"See ante, p. 71, notes 12 and 13.
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is to recognize that the creation of a very limited interest such
as R gave to S was never within the contemplation of the rule
that an "incorporeal" interestin land must be created by deed.
Similarly, after the Statute of Frauds, the privilege or series of
privileges over Longacre, even though frankly conceded to be
an "interest," might well be held not within the intention of
Section i, requiring a writing for the creation of interests in
land."
But it is necessary to hurry along to the next step in the
Pennsylvania court's reasoning. After quoting Chief Justice
Vaughan's dictum58 concerning a mere temporary and revocable
privilege in order to show that the "right and privilege" of
letting down the surface was not an "interest" or "estate," the
learned court proceeds to assert that "the license [in Penman
v. Jones], being coupled with a grant of the coal, or rather with
the reservation of the coal, was irrevocable by the owner of the
surface, and was assignable by the licensee." That is, the
assumption is made,-erroneously, it would seem,-that Chief
Justice Vaughan's language applies not only to a temporary
and revocable privilege, but also to a permanent and irrevocable
(inextinguishable) privilege or series of privileges as to letting
"In support of these suggestions, the following utterance of an able
New York judge may be noted:
"A claim for an easement must be founded upon grant, by deed or
writing, or upon prescription which presupposes one, for it is a permanent
interest in another's land, with a right, at all times, to enter and enjoy
it; but a license is an authority to do a particular act, or a series of acts
upon another's land, without possessing any estate therein. It is founded
in personal confidence, and is not assignable. This distinction between a
privilege or easement carrying an interest in land, and requiring a writing
within the statute of frauds to support it and a licence which may be by
parol, is quite subtle, and it becomes difficult, in some of the cases, todiscern a substantial difference between them.
"I shall not undertake to reconcile these various cases. It is evident the
subject has been understood very differently by different judges. But in
this all agree, that according to the Statute of Frauds, any permanent
interest in the land itself cannot be transferred, except by writing. Much
of the discrepancy may have arisen from the different ideas attached to
the word licence." Savage, C. J., in Mumford v. Whitney (1836) i5
Wend. 380, 392.
Thi§ passage, in spite of the tendency to use language similar to that
of Vaughan, C. J., in Thomas v. Sorrell, shows that the real contrast is
that of a permanent interest as opposed to a temporary and "revocable"
one, rather than that of an interest as opposed to none at all.
Compare also Chancellor Kent, in 3 Com. 452:
"Such a parol license to enjoy a beneficial privilege is not an interest in
land within the Statute of Frauds"
"See ante, p. 93.
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down the surface land. Such an "irrevocable" continuing
privilege (or series of privileges) would seem clearly to be an
interest in land-so substantial an interest as to require a deed at
common law, and a writing under Section i of the Statute of
Frauds.sa This would seem to be true, even if the "right and
privilege" in Penman v. Jones were conceded to consist merely
of a continuing series of privileges; and, of course, it becomes
increasingly difficult to deny that the "right and privilege" is
an "interest" when we take into consideration the accompanying
legal rights (claims) against interference either by the super-
jacent owner or by third parties.
Passing this point by, however, it is interesting to notice that
the Pennsylvania court regards the "right and privilege" as
irrevocable because "coupled with a grant [reservation] of the
coal." Whatever plausibility this statement has at first glance
because apparently fitting in with certain well-known classes of
so-called "licenses coupled with grants," does it not lose its
persuasive force when we notice that the supposed license would
be coupled, in Penman v. Jones, not with the grant of a power
concerning another's land as in the case of profits, or with the
grant of a movable on another's land as in a case like Wood v.
Manley, 9 but with the grant of the whole mineral estate, as
such, to the supposed holder of the "license?" That is, it would
be a license "coupled exclusively with" the grant of the licensee's
own estate. The court cites no case either to explain or to
exemplify its conception of a "license coupled with a grant"; and
such cases as have been observed are of a very different character.
The first important class of cases consists of those relating to
profits a prendre. Thus, a profit consisting of the so-called
"right" to dig for and carry away minerals involves a "grant"
of an aggregate of jural relations including, inter alia, the legal
powers0 of vesting ownership of the severed parts of the servient
"a See Alderson, B., in Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M. & W., at 843,
852, 854.
(1839) ii A. & E. 34.
' Compare the somewhat analogous legal powers of a tenant for life
without impeachment for waste.
As said in Kekewich v. Marker (i5I) 3 McN. & G. 311, 333:
"We then find that the grantor has given the ordinary profits to the
tenant for life, with exemption from waste, or a license to appropriate
a portion of the inheritance, subject to the prior right and discretion of
the trustees for raising portions. It was further insisted that the tenant
for life is the owner of the timber, but that is quite out of the question;
he has nothing but a power, though when he has felled the timber under
97.
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land in the profit owner-legal powers, that is, to alter pro tanto
the jural relations of the servient landowner and to create aggre-
gates of jural relations concerning the (severed) movables in
the owner of the profit.61 In such grants there are also included
the power, it would become a chattel and he would be owner of it. We
are now, however, discussing the relative rights as to standing timber, and
the case cannot therefore be argued, or the claim to fell the timber sup-
ported, upon any existing property in the timber as owner."
Compare also McPherson v. Temiskaming Lumber Co., Ltd. (913) A. C.
145, 152; and (1913) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL I6, 42, n. 6o.
*'Doe v. Wood (I819) 2 B. & Ald. 738; Muskett v. Hill (1839) 5 Bing.
N. C. 7o6; see Clement v. Youngman (1861) 40 Pa. 341, 344; Ryckman v.
Gillis (1874) 57 N. Y. 68; and cf. Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon
(1893) 152 Pa. 286, 296.
In Doe v. Wood, supra, Abbott, C. J., said:
"The purport of the granting part of this indenture, is to grant, for the
term therein mentioned, a liberty, license, power, and authority, to dig,
work, mine, and search for metals and minerals only, that should within
that term be there found, to the use of the grantee, his partners, etc.;
and it gives also further powers for the more effectual exercise of the
main liberty granted . . . its words import a grant of such parts thereof
only as should, upon the licence and power given to search and get, be
found within the described limits, which is nothing more than the grant
of a licence to search and get (irrevocable, indeed, on account of its
carrying an interest) with a grant of such of the ore only as should be
found and got . . . If so, the grantee had no estate or property in the
land itself, or of any particular portion thereof, or in any part of the
ore, metals, or minerals, ungot therein; but he had a right of property
only as to such part thereof as upon the liberties granted to him should be
dug and got. That is no more than a mere right to a personal chattel,
when obtained in pursuance of incorporeal privileges granted for the
purpose of obtaining it. . . . These expressions . . . can . . . have no
further effort than to shew that the grantor supposed that the soil or
minerals, and not a mere liberty or privilege, passed by his deed."
Profits involving wild game and fish differ in one particular. They
involve legal powers to acquire title ("qualified" or "absolute") "by
reducing the game to possession." But the exercise of these powers does
not affect the landowner in precisely the same .way; for the latter himself
does not have ordinary ownership of the game, but merely legal powers
of acquiring title by reducing the game to possession,--these powers being
accompanied, of course, by various rights, privileges and immunities.
Blades v. Higgs (1865) ii H. L. CAs. 62.
For profits of this character, compare Wickham v. Hawker (i84o)
7 M. & W. 62; Fitzgerald v. Firbank [1897] 2 Ch. 96; Bingham v. Salene
(1887) 15 Or. 2o8, 212, 14 Pac. 523.
For a novel and interesting attempt to apply the idea of "a license
coupled with a grant" to the case of a theatre ticket-a license to enter
and remain coupled with the "grant" of a privilege (not power as in the
case of a profit), see the dictum of Buckley, L. J., in Hurst v. Picture
Theaters, Ltd. [1915] I K. B. I, 7: "Let me for a moment discuss this
present case upon the footing that Wood v. Leadbitter stands as good law
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the privileges of physically severing or causing to be severed
the various mineral portions from the corpus of the land; various
rights (or claims) against interference with or disturbance of
the activities and advantages connected with the exercise of
such privileges and powers-rights (or claims) against third
parties as well as against the grantor of the profit ;62 also various
immunities similar to those that any owner of property ordinarily
has.63 As regards such profits, the aggregate of jural relations
is not, in any ordinary case, subject to a power of "revocation"
or extinguishment by the grantor. This is true of the continuing
or repetitive privileges involved as well as of the other elements.
Hence the frequent loose description of the situation as involving
an "irrevocable license" coupled with a grant. But the term
license is really used here most unfortunately,--as that term, for
the sake of clearness of thought and exactness of expression,
should be reserved for the "mere permission" under considera-
tion by Chief Justice Vaughan in Thomas v. Sorrell-that is, in
the first paragraph of the quotation above given0 4
at this date. I am going to say presently that to my mind it does not, but
suppose it does stand as good law at this date. What is the grant in this
case? .... That which was granted to him was the right [privilege] to
enjoy looking at a spectacle, to attend a performance from its beginning
to its end. That which was called the license, the right [privilege] to
go upon the premises, was only something granted to him for the purpose
of enabling him to have that which had been granted to him, namely, the
,right [privilege] to see. He could not see the performance unless he
went into the building ... So that here there was a license coupled with
a grant. If so, Wood v. Leadbitter does not stand in the way at all. A
license coupled with a grant is not revocable; Wood v. Leadbitter
affirmed as much." a
Sed qu.: was there not, in Wood v. Leadbitter an attempted grant of
the privilege of seeing the races?
Fitzgerald v. Firbank [1897] 2 Ch. 96.
, See ante, p. 69, n. 8.
To be compared with cases of profits e prendre are those referred to
in Tiffany, Real Property (i9o3) 683:
"So, in some states, an oral sale of growing trees is insufficient to pass
them as such, and is regarded as giving the vendee merely a license or
permission to cut the trees, which is revocable until the trees are cut, but,
after they are cut, the sale takes effect upon them in their chattel character,
and the vendee then, having an interest in the trees, has an irrevocable
license to enter on the land for their removal."
See, for this doctrine, Giles v. Simonds (i6o, Mass.) 15 Gray, 441;
United Soc. v. Brooks (i888) 145 Mass. 410.
Tiffany's characterization of these cases seems hardly adequate, as it
fails to bring out the "revocable" legal powers of acquiring title to the
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A second class of authorities involving so-called "licenses
coupled with a grant" consists of cases like Wood v. Manley.65
This leading case established the rule that the sale of a movable
located on the vendor's land, coupled with permission to enter on
the land for the purpose of removal, results in an "irrevocable"
privilege (frequently called "license") of entering on the land
and removing the object purchased. It would seem dear that
in this case also there are accompanying rights (or claims)
against interference. It is equally clear that the total aggregate
(rights, privileges, powers, and immunities) should be recognized
as an interest in land, even though not within the general com-
mon law requirement of a deed or the requirement of Section I
of the Statute of Frauds. Similar considerations are applicable
to cases involving permission to place movables upon another's
land and to remove them at some subsequent time.e6
In leaving this part of the discussion, the suggestion may be
ventured that an examination of the court's application of the
category of license tends only to confirm the conclusion, already
reached on independent grounds, that the "right and privilege"
in Penman v. Jones should more properly have been classified
as an easement appurtenant, with the necessary inference that
such "right and privilege" passed with the subjacent estate,
even apart from the special language about to be considered.
(2) Dm THE "RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE" PASS UNDER THE LAN-
GUAGE OF THE CONVEYANCE OF 1891, INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS
BEING AN EASEMENT?
The court concedes that the interest, whatever it may be called,
is freely alienable, along with the subjacent estate proper.
Earlier Pennsylvania cases, already noticed in detail, leave no
room for doubt as to this point. Unless, therefore, there is
something peculiar about this sort of interest so as to require
unusually specific terms of conveyance, it would seem that the
words "all the estate, right, title, interest, benefit, property,
severed trees by exercising the "revocable" legal privileges of physically
severing the trees.
The cases put by Vaughan, C. J., in the second paragraph of the quota-
tion given in the text seem to be similar to those now under consideration.
The "grant" that he refers to is, in reality, the grant of legal powers,
rather than of ownership of the severed things as such.
(1839) 1I A. & E., 34.
'"Giles v. Simonds (186o, Mass.) 15 Gray, 441; cf. the explanation given
in Browne, St. Frauds (5th ed., 1895) sec. 27; also the similar explanation
of Alderson, B., in Wood v. Leadbitter (1845) 13 M. & W., at 853.
FAULTY ANALYSIS IN EASEMENT CASES ior
claim and demand whatsoever" together with "all and singular
. . . the appurtenances . . . belonging to the said property or
in anywise appertaining to the same" were ample to cover the
"right and privilege" of letting down the surface. Apart from
absolutely specific terms, it would be difficult to find more compre-
hensive language. It is true that in Stilley v. Buffalo Co. 67 and in
Kirwin v. Del., L. & W. R. R. Co.88 the terms employed were
quite specific; but, as will be remembered, no reference to this
point was made in either of these cases, and, instead, the court's
reasoning proceeded along very broad lines as to the intentions
of the original parties as indicated by their instruments of con-
veyance and the surrounding circumstances.
It would seem unnecessary, however, to resort to these earlier
cases to show the adequacy of such inclusive generic terms as
have just been quoted from the conveyance of 1891; for does
not the very case of Penman v. Jones afford all-sufficient
authority?
(3) WAS THE COURT CONSISTENT IN HOLDING, IN SPITE OF ITS
NEGATIVE ANSWER TO THE SECOND QUESTION, THAT THE LANGUAGE
IN THE CONVEYANCE FROm A TO D WAS SUFFICIENT TO PASS THE
"RIGHT AND PRIVILEGE" TO D?
This question is clearly enough suggested by the facts of
Penman v. Jones, although the limited purposes of this article
do not demand an extended discussion thereof or, much less,
any positive answer. The important words in the conveyance
from A to D were, it may be recalled, "all and every the real
estate or interest of any kind or nature in real estate, lands,
tenements or hereditaments," etc. These words, in and of them-
selves, seem less comprehensive and intensive than those in the
conveyance from A to C. The court's reasons for denying
natural force and effect to the words of the "A-C" conveyance
and attributing such force and effect to the weaker words of the
"A-D" conveyance are hardly convincing. Those reasons are
given chiefly in the language already quoted from the majority
opinion; and, as will be remembered, they seem to turn largely,
if not entirely, on an unfortunate identification of the subjacent
owner's privilege of letting down the surface with a superfacent
owner's right (or claim) that the surface should not be let down."9
" (1912) 234 Pa. 492, 497. For full consideration of this case, see ante,
p. 78.
I (x915) 249 Pa. 98, 1oi. For full consideration of this case, see ante,
p. 78.
1 See ante, p. 83, and p. 84, n. 40.
